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Chapter Two 
A Legal History of 
American Roman Catholic Schools 
Charles J. Russo 
INTRODUCTION 
'fheSecond Vatican Council's Declaration on Catholic Education (Gravissi-
'!"urn Educationis [GE], literally "the Importance of Education") was one of 
Its crowning achievements. GE was promulgated in 1965, a time when 
A.merican Catholic elementary and secondary schools were at about their 
zenith in terms of student enrollments before heading into a steady decline in 
Illll11bers of institutions and enrollments. 
As could have been expected, GE was consistent with the Church ' s uni-
v.ersal teaching in recognizing education as essentially a fundamental human 
nght. Although it was unlikely to have done so intentionally, GE reflects 
fi'om a Catholic perspective much the same message as is contained in such 
secular international human rights documents as the 1948 Universal Declar-
Qtion on Human Rights, the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, and 
the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
EthniC, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. GE thus recognized the right to 
Chtistian- specifically Roman Catholic- education and the authority of par-
ents to make such free choices for their children . 
A.ccording to GE, "Parents who have the primary and inalienable right 
and duty to educate their children must enjoy true liberty in their choice of 
Schools" (GE, 6). The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary (Pierce , 1925), the 
JUslices' first case involving religion and education, predated GE by more 
than 40 years. In Pierce the Court upheld the rights of parents to direct the 
UPbringing of their children, presaging later developments that impacted pos-
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itively on religiously affiliated non-public educational institutions, most not-
ably for this chapter and book, Catholic schools. 
Invalidating a law from Oregon that would have obligated parents to send 
their children to public schools, the Court reasoned in Pierce that " [t]he child 
is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations" (p. 535). In so ruling, the Court recognized 
the rights of proprietors of a Roman Catholic school and a secular military 
academy to operate, setting the stage for further growth and development of 
religiously affiliated non-public elementary and secondary schools, the vast 
majority of which were Roman Catholic schools. 
As important as Pierce was, especially combined with the role religion 
played both in American history and education, the Supreme Court did not 
rely on the First Amendment Religion Clauses in the fray over religiously 
affiliated non-public schools until 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education 
(Everson). Pursuant to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, "Con-
gress shall make no law regarding an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof." Everson was a dispute over the costs of transport-
ing chi ldren to their religiously affiliated, mostly Roman Catholic, non-pub-
lic schools. 
Following Everson, the Supreme Court resolved more K-12 cases on 
religion under the First Amendment than any other subject involving school-
ing. It is important to note that insofar as the litigation involving Roman 
Catholic schoo ls also impacts other religiously-affiliated non-public schools, 
this chapter tends to use the latter term unless a case was initially litigated in 
one or primarily involved Catholic institutions. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court have shaped the parameters of permis-
sible aid that the Federal and state govenunents can provide to Catholic, and 
other faith-based schools. This chapter examines its major decisions. The 
chapter focuses largely on Supreme Court cases involving elementary and 
secondary education because they served to help effectuate, albeit without 
intending to do so, the basic principles proclaimed in GE. 
LEGAL PREHISTORY 
The 200 Roman Catholic schools in existence in 1860 grew to more than 
1,300 in the next decade. Spurred on by the 1884 Third Plenary Council of 
Baltimore, which mandated the creation of a parish school near every Catho-
lic Church to serve the rapidly growing immigrant population that was large-
ly Lmwelcome in many public schools, by the turn of the century almost 
5,000 Catholic schools operated in the United States (Mahr, 1987). During 
this same time, the number of Catholics in the United States rose from 
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7,855,000 in 1890 to an incredible ]7,735,553 in 1920 (Buetow, 1970, p. 
167, as cited in the Official Catholic Directory). 
The rapid growth in the numbers of Catholics and their schools notwith-
standing, they were not involved in federa l litigation until Pierce. At the 
s.ame time, though, a small number of state cases dealt with ancillalY ques-
bons as, for instance, courts in New York (0 'Connor v. Hendrick, 1906), and 
Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Herr, 1910) agreed that Roman Catholic 
nuns could not wear rel igious garb if they taught in public schools. 
Pierce, the first Supreme Court case implicating Roman Catholic and 
other religiously affi liated non-public schools, relied on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Estab li slU11ent Clause. 
~ater, on entering the modern era of its EstablislU11ent Clause jurisprudence 
III Everson, the Supreme Court examined two cases that significantly im-
pacted faith-based schools and their students. In both cases, the Court re lied 
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the 
Establishment Clause. 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary 
The more far-reaching of the Supreme Court's two early cases on religion 
and non-public schools was Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary (Pierce, 1925). In Pierce, the proprietors of two schools in 
Oregon, a Roman Catholic school and a secular school (the Hill Military 
Academy), challenged a voter-approved initiative enacted in 1922, intended 
to go into effect in 1926, that made public school attendance compulsory. 
The law required all students who did not need what would today be de-
scribed as special education between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend 
public schools, unless they had already completed the eighth grade. Not 
surprisingly, the proprietors of the schools quickly filed a suit cha llenging the 
law as presenting a threat to the continued existence of their institutions. 
After a federal trial court enjoined enforcement of the statute, the Su-
preme Court unanimously affirmed that enforcing the law would have seri-
ously impaired, if not destroyed, the profitability of the schools whi le dimin-
ishing the value of their property. Although recognizing the power of the 
state "reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine 
them, their teachers and pupils .. . (Pierce, 534)," the Court focused on the 
schools' property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Pierce Court grounded its judgment on the realization that the 
schools sought protection fro m unreasonable interference with t1~ eir students 
and the destruction of their business and property. The Court also decided 
that while states may oversee such important features as health , safety, and 
teacher qualifications relating to the operation of non-public schools, they 
could not do so to an extent greater than they did for public schools. 
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Cochran v. Louisiana State Board o/Education 
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education (Cochran, 1930) involved a 
state law providing free textbooks for all students in the state, regardless of 
where they attended school. A taxpayer unsuccessfully challenged the law on 
the ground that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by taking private 
property through taxation for a non-public purpose. As in Pierce, the Su-
preme Court resolved the dispute based on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First Amendment' s Establishment 
Clause. 
In unanimously affmlling the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisia-
na that insofar as the students, rather than their schools, were the beneficiar-
ies of the law, the United States Supreme Court agreed that the statute had 
valid secular purpose. In so doing, the Court anticipated the Child Benefit 
Test that emerged in Everson v. Board of Education (1947). As discussed 
below, while the Supreme Court has consistently upheld similar textbook 
provisions, as reflected in the companior! chapter state courts have struck 
them down under their own more restrictive constitutions. 
STATE AID TO ROMAN CATHOLIC AND OTHER 
RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause perspective on state aid to K-12 
education, sometimes referred to as "parochiaid," evolved through three 
phases. During the first stage, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education 
in 1947 and ending with Board of Education of Central School District No.1 
v. Allen in 1968, the Court created the Child Benefit Test, which allows 
selected f01"ms of publicly funded aid on the ground that it helps children 
rather than their faith-based schools. 
The span between Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971 (by far the leading case on 
the Establishment Clause in educational settings, with the Supreme Court 
applying it in more than thirty of its opinions), and Aguilar v. Felton in 1985 
was the nadir from the perspective of supporters of the Child Benefit Test. 
This period represented the low point because during this time the Court 
largely refused to move beyond the limits it initiated in Everson and Allen. In 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District in 1993, the Court resun"ected 
the Child Benefit Test, allowing it to enter a phase that extends through the 
present day, in which more fonus of aid have been permissible. 
Given this history, the remaining sections examine major Supreme Court 
cases involving state aid to faith-based schools and their students, essentially 
in the order in which they were litigated. These sections cover transportation, 
textbooks, secular services and salary supplements, aid to parents (divided 
into tuition reimbursements and income tax returns), reimbursements to 
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faith-based schools (covering instructional materials and support services), 
and vouchers. 
Transportation 
As noted, Everson v. Board of Education (1947) was the first Supreme Court 
case on the merits of the Establishment Clause and education. Everson in-
volved a law from New Jersey permitting local school boards to enter into 
Contracts for student transportation. 
After a local board authorized reimbursement to parents for the costs of 
bus fare for sending their children to primarily Roman Catholic schools, a 
taxpayer filed suit, challenging the law as unconstitutional in two respects: 
first, in an approach not unlike the plaintiff's unsuccessful argument in Co-
chran, he alleged that the law authorized the state to take the money of some 
citizens by taxation and bestow it on others for the private purpose of sup-
porting non-public schools in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
second, he charged that the statute was one "respecting an establislunent of 
religion," since it forced him to contribute to support church schools in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim 
in Everson in interpreting the law as having a public purpose, adding that the 
First Amendment did not prohibit the state from extending general benefits 
to alI of its citizens without regard to their religious beliefs. The Court treated 
student transportation as another category of public services such as police, 
fire, and health protection. 
In what became something of a Trojan Horse because of difficulties it 
would create for state aid to faith-based schools, the analysis in the majority 
opinion was proffered by Justice Hugo Black, a fonner member of the Ku 
Klux Klan (Hamburger, 2002, p. 422). Of course, the Klan hated Catholics 
along with African-Americans, Jews, among others. Black introduced the 
Jeffersonian metaphor into the Court's First Amendment analysis, writing 
that "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. 
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the 
slightest breach" (Everson, 1947, p. 18). 
Following Everson, states had to choose whether to provide publicly 
funded transportation to students who attend faith-based schools. As exam-
ined in the companion chapter, lower courts, relying on state constitutional 
provisions, reached mixed results on this issue. 
In Wolman v. Waller (Wolman, 1977), the Supreme Court considered 
whether public funds could be used to provide transportation for field trips 
for children who attended faith-based schools in Ohio. The Court held that 
the practice was unconstitutional because insofar as field trips were oriented 
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to the curriculum, they were in the category of instruction rather than that of 
non-ideological secular services such as transportation to and from school. 
Textbooks 
Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen (Allen, 1968), 
another case involving textbooks, was litigated at the Supreme Court three 
years after Catholic schools reached their peak enrollments in the United 
States. In Allen, the Justices relied on the First rather than the Fourteenth, 
Amendment. They essentially followed the pre~edent from Cochran in af-
fil111ing the constitutionality of a statute from New York that required local 
school boards to loan books to children in grades seven to 12 who attended 
non-public schools. 
The law at issue in Allen did not mandate that the books loaned to all 
students had to be the same as those used in the public schools but did require 
that titles be approved by local board officials before they could be adopted. 
Relying largely on the Child Benefit Test, the Court observed that the stat-
ute's purpose was not to aid religious or non-public schools and that its 
primary effect was to improve the quality of education for all children. 
Other than for the delivery of special education services to individual 
students-as in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1 993)-Allen 
represented the outer limit of the Chi ld Benefit Test for large groups of 
children prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Agostini v. Felton (1997) 
discussed below. The Justices upheld like textbook provisions in Meek v. 
Pittenger (1975) and Wolman, both of which are also examined in more 
detail below. 
Secular Services and Salary Supplements 
The Supreme Court's most important case involving the Establishment 
Clause and education was Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). In Lemon, the Court 
invalidated a statute from Pennsylvania calling for the purchase of secular 
services and a law from Rhode Is land that provided salary supplements for 
teachers in non-public schools, most of which were Roman Catholic. 
The Pennsylvania law directed the superintendent of education to pur-
chase specified secular educational services from non-public schools. Offi-
cials directly reimbursed the non-public schools for their actual expenditures 
for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. The superinten-
dent had to approve the textbooks and materials, which were restricted to the 
areas of mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and phys-
ical education. 
In Rhode Island, officials could supplement the salaries of certificated 
teachers of secular subjects in non-public elementary schools by directly 
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paying them amounts not in excess of 15% of their current annual salaries; 
their sa laries could not exceed the maximum paid to public school teachers. 
The supplements were available to teachers in non-public schools where 
average per-pupil expenditures on secular education were less than in public 
~chools. In addition, the teachers had to use the same materials as were used 
In public schools. 
In striking down both laws, the Supreme Court enwlciated the three-part 
test known as the Lemon test. In creating this measure, the Court added a 
third prong to the two-part test it created in School District of Abington 
!ownship v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett (J 963), companion cases deal-
Ing with prayer and Bible reading in public schools. This third part, which 
dealt with excessive entanglement, came from Walz v. Tax Commission of 
New York City (1970), which upheld New York State's practice of providing 
state property tax exemptions for church property that is used in worship 
services. 
According to the Lemon test: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative 
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Tlu-ee such tests may be 
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion" (Lemon, 1971 , 612-13). 
As to entanglement and state aid to faith-based schools, the Court iden-
tified three other factors: "[W]e must examine the character and purposes of 
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State pro-
vides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious 
authority" (Lemon, 1971,615). 
In Lemon the Supreme Court maintained that aid for teachers' salaries 
was different from secular, neutral, or non-ideological services, facilities, or 
materials. Reflecting on Allen, the Court remarked that teachers have a sub-
stantially different ideological character than books. In terms of the potential 
for involving faith or morals in secular subjects, the Court feared that while 
the content of a textbook can be identified, how a teacher covers subject 
matter is not. 
The Lemon Court added that conflict can arise when teachers who work 
under the direction of religious officials are faced with separating religious 
and secular aspects of education. The COUlt held that the safeguards neces-
sary to ensure that teachers avoid non-ideological perspectives give rise to 
impermissible entanglement. The Court concluded that an ongoing history of 
government grants to non-public schools suggests that these programs were 
almost always accompanied by varying measures of control. 
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Higher Education 
The Supreme Court has yet to hand down a judgment directly involving 
Catholic higher education. In a related development, though, on the same day 
that it ruled in Lemon, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Higher 
Education Facilities Act of 1963, which made construction grants available 
to institutions of higher education, including church-related colleges and 
lmiversities. In Tilton v. Richardson (Tilton, 1971), a case originating in 
Connecticut, the Court reasoned that while the section of the law that limited 
recipients' obligation not to use federally financed facilities for sectarian 
instruction or religious worship for 20 years unconstitutionally allowed a 
contribution of property of substantial value to religious bodies, that section 
was severable. 
The Supreme Court was satisfied that the remainder of the statute in 
Tilton did not violate the First Amendment. In upholding the remainder of 
the statute, the Justices distinguished Tilton from Lemon insofar as in Tilton, 
indoctrination was not a substantial purpose or activity of church-related 
colleges because the student body was not composed of impressionable chil-
dren, the aid was non-ideological, and there was no excessive entanglement 
since the grants were one-time and single-purpose. 
Two years later, in Hunt v. McNair (1973), the Supreme Court decided 
that insofar as religion was not pervasive in an institution, South Carolina 
was free to issue revenue bonds to benefit the church-related college. The 
Court was satisfied that this arrangement was acceptable because the bonds 
were not guaranteed by public funds. 
Aids to Parents 
Tuition Reimbursement 
Two months after Lemon, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute that 
allowed parents whose children attended non-public schools to request tui-
tion reimbursement. The same parent as in Lemon challenged the new law as 
having the primary effect of advancing religion. 
In Sloan v. Lemon (Sloan, 1973) the Supreme Court affIrmed that the law 
impermissibly singled out a class of citizens for a special economic benefit. 
The Justices viewed this as unlike the "indirect" and "incidental" benefits 
that flowed to religious schools from programs that aided all parents by 
supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks for their children. The 
Court commented that transportation and textbooks were carefully restricted 
to the purely secular side of church-affiliated schools and did not provide 
special aid to their students. 
The Supreme Court expanded on Sloan's analysis in a case from New 
York, Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (Ny-
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qUist, 1973). The Court ruled that even though the grants went to parents 
rather than to school officials, this did not compel a different result. The 
Court explained that since parents would have used the money to pay for 
tuition and the law failed to separate secular from religious uses, the effect of 
the aid unmistakably would have provided the desired financial support for 
non-pUblic schools. 
In so doing, the Nyquist Court rejected the state's argument that parents 
Were not simply conduits because they were free to spend the money in any 
malU1er they chose since they paid the tuition and the law merely provided 
for reimbursements. The Court indicated that even if the grants were offered 
a~ incentives to have parents send their children to religious schools, the law 
Violated the Establishment Clause regardless of whether the money made its 
Way into the coffers of the religious institutions. 
Income Tax 
Another section of the same New York statute in Nyquist aided parents via 
income tax benefits. Under the law, parents of children who attended I)on-
public schools were entitled to income tax deductions as long as they did not 
receiVe tuition reimbursements under the other part of the statute. The Su-
preme Court invalidated this provision in pointing out that in practical terms 
there was little difference, for purposes of evaluating whether such aid had 
the effect of advancing religion, between a tax benefit and a tuition grant. 
!he Court based its judgment on the notion that under both programs qual-
Ifying parents received the same form of encouragement and reward for 
Sending their children to non-pUblic schools. 
In Mueller v. Allen (Mueller, 1983), the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
from Minnesota that granted all parents state income tax deductions for the 
actual costs of tuition, textbooks, and transportation associated with sending 
their children to K-12 schools. The law afforded all parents deductions of 
$500 for children in grades K- 6 and $700 for those in grades 7- 12. 
The Justices distinguished Mueller from Nyquist primarily because the 
tax benefit was available to all parents, not only those whose children were in 
non-public schools. The Court also recognized that the deduction was one 
among many rather than a single, favored type of taxpayer expense. 
Acknowledging the legislature'S broad latitude to create classifications 
a~d distinctions in tax statutes, and that the state benefited from the scheme 
Since it promoted an educated citizenry while reducing the costs of public 
education, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the law met all three of 
Lemon' s prongs. The Court paid little attention to the fact that since the 
state's public schools were essentially free, the expenses of parents whose 
Children attended them were at most minimal and that about 96% of taxpay-
ers who benefited had children enrolled in religious schools. 
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Reimbursements to Faith-Based Schools 
On the same day that it resolved Nyquis.t, in a second case from New York, 
the Supreme Court applied basically the same rationale in Levitt v. Commit-
tee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (Levitt, 1973). Here the Court 
invalidated a law allowing the state to reimburse non-public schools for 
expenses incurred while administering and reporting test results as well as 
other records. Insofar as there were no restrictions on the use of the founds, 
such that teacher-prepared tests on religious subject matter were seemingly 
reimbursable, the Court observed that the aid had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religious education because there were insufficient safeguards in 
place to regulate how the monies were spent. 
Wolman v. Walter (1977), a case from Ohio, saw the Supreme Court 
uphold a law pem1itting reimbursement for religious schools where officials 
used standardized tests and scoring services to evaluate student progress. The 
Justices distinguished these tests from the ones in Levitt since the latter were 
neither drafted nor scored by non-public school personnel. The Court also 
reasoned that the law did not authorize payments to church-sponsored 
schools for costs associated with administering the tests. 
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan (1980, 
Regan) the Supreme Court reexamined another aspect of Levitt after the New 
York State legislature modified the law. Under its new provisions, the statute 
provided reimbursements to non-public schools for the actual costs of com-
plying with state requirements for reporting on students and for administer-
ing mandatory and optional state-prepared examinations. Unlike the law in 
Ohio, this statute permitted the tests to be graded by personnel in the non-
public schools that were, in tum, reimbursed for these services. The law also 
created accounting procedures to monitor reimbursements. 
The Regan Court conceded that the differences between the statutes were 
permissible, since scoring of essentially objective tests and recording their 
results along with attendance data offered no significant opportunity for re-
ligious indoctrination while serving secular state educational purposes. The 
Court concluded that the accounting method did not create excessive entan-
glement since the reimbursements were equal to the achlal costs. 
Instructional Materials 
In Meek v. Pittenger (1975 , Meek), the Supreme Court examined the legality 
of loans of instructional materials, including textbooks and equipment, to 
faith-based schools in Pennsylvania. Although the Court upheld the loan of 
textbooks, it struck down parts of the law on periodicals, films, recordings, 
and laboratory equipment as well as equipment for recording and projecting; 
the statute had the primary effect of advancing religion due to the predomi-
nantly religious character of participating schools. 
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The Meek Court was concemed because the only statutory requirement 
imposed on the schools to qualify for the loans was directing their cunicula 
to offer the subjects and activities mandated by the commonwealth's board 
of education. The Court thought that because the church-related scl~ools were 
the primary beneficiaries, the massive aid to their educational functIon neces-
sarily resulted in aid to their sectarian enterprises as a whole. 
The Supreme Court reached sim ilar results in Wolman v. Walter (Wol-
man, 1977), upholding a statute from Ohio which specified that textbook 
loans were to be made to students or their parents, rather than directly to their 
non-public schools. The Justices struck down a provision that would have 
allowed loans of instructional equipment including projectors, tape recorders, 
~'ecord players, maps and globes, and science kits. Echoing Meek, the Court 
lllvalidated the statute's authorization of the loans in light of its fear that 
i~sofar as it would be impossible to separate the secu lar and. sectarian ~nc­
hons for which these items were being used, the aid inevItably provIded 
support for the religious roles of the schools. 
Mitchell v. Helms (Helms, 2000), a Supreme Court case originating in 
Louisiana, expanded the bOlmdaries of permissible aid to faith-based schools 
(Mawdsley & Russo, 2001). A plurality upheld the constitutionality of ch~p­
ter 2 of Title I-now Title VI-of the Elementary and Secondary EducatIon 
~ct (2014), a federal law that permits the loans of instructional materials 
lllciuding library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps 
to non-public schools. 
In Helms, the Supreme Court relied on the modified Lemon test enunci-
ated in Agostini v. Felton, discussed below, by reviewing on ly its first two 
parts while recasting entanglement as one criterion in evaluating a statute's 
effect. Insofar as the purpose part of the test was not cha llenged, the plurality 
on ly considered chapter 2's effect. They concluded that it did not foster 
impermissible indoctrination because aid was allocated pursuant to neutral 
secular criteria that neither favored nor disfavored religion and was available 
to all schools based on secular, nondiscriminatory grounds. In its rationale, 
the plurality explicitly reversed those parts of Meek and Wolman that were 
inconsistent with its analysis on loans of instructional materials. 
Support Services 
In Meek v. Pittenger (1975), the Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsylvania 
law permitting public school personnel to provide auxiliary services on-site 
in faith-based schools. At the same time, the Court forbade the delivery of 
remedial and accelerated instructional programs, guidance counseling and 
testing, and services to aid children who were educationally disadvantaged. 
The Court asserted that it was immaterial that the students would have re-
ceived remedial , rather than advanced, work; the required survei llance to 
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ensure the absence of ideology would have given rise to excessive entangle-
ment between church and state. 
Wolman v. Walter (1977) saw the Supreme Court reach mixed results on 
aid. In addition to upholding the textbook loan program, the Court allowed 
Ohio to supply non-public schools with state-mandated tests while allowing 
public school employees to go on-site to perfonn diagnostic tests to evaluate 
whether students needed speech, hearing, and psychological services. The 
Court also allowed public funds to be spent providing therapeutic services to 
students from non-public schools as long as they were delivered off-site. The 
Court forbade state officials from loaning instructional materials and equip-
ment to schools or from using funds to pay for field trips for students in non-
public schools. 
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills 
School District (Zobrest) was a harbinger of change to come in its Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. At issue was a school board in Arizona's refusal 
to provide a sign language interpreter for a student who was deaf, under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, after he transferred into a Ro-
man Catholic high school. In a suit filed as the student entered high school 
but which was resolved shortly after he graduated, the Court found that an 
interpreter provided neutral aid to him without offering financial benefits to 
his parents or school, and that there was no governmental participation in the 
instruction because the interpreter was only a conduit to effectuate his com-
munications. 
The Zobrest Court relied in part on Witters v. Washington Department of 
Services for the Blind (1986), wherein it upheld the constitutionality of ex-
tending a general vocational assistance program to a blind man who was 
studying to become a clergyman at a religious college. Yet the Supreme 
Court of Washington later interpreted its state constitution as forb idding such 
use of public funds, and the Supreme Court refused to hear a f·urther appeal 
(Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 1989). 
A year later, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District 
v. Grumet (1994), the Supreme Court reviewed a case where the New York 
State Legislature enacted a statute creating a school district with the same 
boundaries as an Orthodox Jewish community. The legislature created the 
district in seeking to accommodate the needs of parents of children with 
disabilities who wished to send them to a nearby school that would have 
honored their religious customs and beliefs, particularly with regard to die-
tary practices. 
On fu.rther review of state court orders invalidating the law, the Court 
affirmed that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court maintained that 
while a state may accommodate a group's religious needs by seeking to 
reduce or eliminate special burdens, it went too far. Instead, the COUJ1 sug-
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Establishment Clause problem. Still New York's highest court Jnva ~ a ed the r . d 'CI . lsofar as It ha 
eVlse law as a violation of the Establishment ause, 11 
the fC 1997' Grumet v. 
elect of advancing one religion (Grumet v. CuomO, ' 
Pataki, 1999). . 
A th . bl' and non-public 
no er set of conflicts arose when officials \0 pu IC ft . h 
schools t d' . M . tl n a decade a er t e 
en ere 111to cooperatIve arrangements. Ole la 
SUpreme Court of Michigan upheld a state constitutional amendment on 
shared t' " t 've program. The line, officIals 1\1 Grand Rapids created an ex ensl 0 of 
program grew to the point where publicly paid teachers conducted 10 Yo 
classes in religious schools. Many of them worked in the r~li~ious sch.ools. 
After the Sixth Circuit invalidated the plan, in School Dlstrzct of Clty of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball (Ball, 1985) the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
released time program was unconsti;utional because it failed all t1u'ee prongs 
of the Lemon test. 
On the same day that it resolved Ball, in a more far-reachi.ng case, the 
SUpreme COUlt reviewed a dispute from New York City. In Agudar v. Felton 
(Aguilar, 1985), the Justices considered whether public school teachers could 
provide remedial instruction under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (1 965)-enacted the same year as Gravissimum Edu-
c~tionis was promulgated-in religiously affi liated non-public schools. The 
TItle I provision of the Act, which passed with considerable suppo~t from 
Catholic leaders in particular (Buetow, 1970), was designed for ~pe~lficall~ 
targeted chi ldren, who were educationally disadvantaged, on-sIte \l1 theIr 
faith-based schools. 
In Aguilar v. Felton (Aguilar, 1985), the Supreme Court affirmed earlier 
?rders that the program permitting the on-site delivery of services to chi ldren 
\l1 their religiously affiliated non-public schools, the vast majority of which 
were Roman Catholic, was unconstitutional. Even though the New York City 
Board of Education (NYCBOE) developed safeguards to ensure that public 
funds were not spent for religious purposes, the Court struck the program 
down based on the fear that a monitoring system to have avoided the creation 
of an impennissible relationship between Church and state might have re-
sulted in the presence of excessive entanglement under the third prong of the 
Lemon test. 
Twelve years later, in Agostini v. Felton (Agostini, 1997), the Supreme 
Court took the unusual step of dissolving the injunction that it upheld in 
Aguilar (Russo & Osborne, 1997). The Court reasoned that the Title I pro-
gram did not violate the Lemon test since there was no governmental indoc-
trination, there were no differences between recipients based on religion, and 
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there was no excessive entanglement. The Court thus ruled that a federally 
funded program that provides supplemental, remedial instruction and coun-
seling services to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid 
under the Establishment Clause when the assistance is provided on-site in 
faith-based schools pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as 
those that the NYCBOE implemented. Perhaps the most important outcome 
in Agostini was the Court's having modified the Lemon test by reviewing 
only its first two prongs, purpose and effect, while recasting entanglement as 
one criterion in evaluating a statute's effect. 
Vouchers 
Considerable controversy has arisen over the use of vouchers, with courts 
reaching mixed results in disputes over their constitutionality. Still, the only 
Supreme Court case on vouchers arose in Ohio. The Ohio General Assembly, 
acting pursuant to a desegregation order, enacted the Ohio Pilot Project 
Scholarship Program (OPPSP) to assist children in Cleveland's failing public 
schools. The main goal of the OPPSP was to permit an equal number of 
students to receive vouchers and tutorial assistance grants while attending 
regular public schools. Another part of the law provided greater choices to 
parents and children via the creation of community, or charter, schools and 
magnet schools. A third section featured tutorial assistance for children. 
The Supreme Court 6fOhio upheld the OPPSP but severed the part of the 
law affording priority to parents who belonged to a religious group support-
ing a sectarian institution (Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 1999). Moreover, in 
finding that the OPPSP violated the state constitutional requirement that 
every statute have only one subject, the court struck it down. Still, when the 
court stayed enforcement of its order to avoid disrupting the then-current 
school year, the Ohio General Assembly quickly reenacted a revised statute. 
After lower federal courts, relying largely on Nyquist (1973), enjoined the 
operation of the revised statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause, the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (Zel-
man, 2002), the Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and upheld 
the constitutionality of the OPPSP (Russo & Mawdsley, 2002). 
Relying on Agostini, the Zelman Court began by conceding the lack of a 
dispute over the program's valid secular purpose in providing programming 
for poor children in a failing school system. The Court examined whether it 
had the forbidden effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. The Court up-
held the voucher program because as part of the state's far-reaching attempt 
to provide greater educational opporhmities in a failing school system, the 
law allocated aid on the basis of neutral secular criteria that neither favored 
nor disfavored religion, was made available to both religious and secular 
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis, and offered assistance directly to 
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a broad class of citizens who directed the aid to religious schools based 
entirely on their own genuine and independent private choices. . . 
The Zelman Court was not concerned by the fact that most of t!1e p~tICI­
pating schools were faith-based because parents chose to send their ch~ldren 
to them insofar as surrounding public schools refused to take part I.n the 
program. If anything, the Court acknowledged that most of the .chlldren 
attended the religiously affiliated non-public schools, most of which were 
Roman Catholic, not as a matter of law but because they were unwelcomed 
in the public schools. The Court concluded that insofar as it was following an 
unbroken line of its own precedent supporting true private par~nta.l ~hoice 
~hat provided benefits directly to a wide range of needy private mdlvlduals, 
Its only choice was to uphold the voucher program. 
CONCLUSION 
Roman Catholic schools clearly have the legal right to operate but face an 
increasingly uncertain futme in the face of declining enrollments due to a 
variety of factors beyond the scope of this chapter. Even so, as with most 
issues involving the law, the one thing to be sure of is that litigation will 
continue over the status of aid to Catholic schools, their students, and par-
ents. 
The extent to which aid may be available to Catholic schools of all levels 
depends on a combination of legislative action and judicial interpretation by 
the Supreme Court which, as demonstrated, has gone through three distinct 
periods of greater or lesser support for the schools. Whether the Court is 
willing to continue to support aid to Roman Catholic and other religiously 
affi liated non-public schools bears constant watching. 
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